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CONDUCT AND BELIEF IN THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE: DEVELOPMENTS AND DEVIATIONS IN
LYNG V NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY
PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
INTRODUCTION

I am convinced that no liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution guarantees
than is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause
explicit in the First Amendment and imbedded in the Fourteenth.
-Justice Potter Stewart'
The free exercise clause of the first amendment prohibits a legislature from enacting laws that interfere with an individual's religious practice and belief.2 The Supreme Court's modem 3 free
exercise decisions have echoed Justice Stewart's sentiment, applying
the strictest scrutiny to laws that conflict with an individual's ability
to practice sincerely held religious beliefs. 4 In its most recent decisions, however, the Court has reduced the level of scrutiny applied
to free exercise challenges, adopting a more restrictive interpretation of the personal religious freedom secured by the first
amendment. 5
This Note first explores a normative theory of free exercise protection 6-that religious freedom must encompass religious practices
and conduct-and then traces the evolution of the Court's standard
for protecting free exercise rights. 7 Early Court decisions adopted a
strict construction of the free exercise clause, protecting freedom of
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
" U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment freedoms were first incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and applied to the states in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
s Modem free exercise doctrine originated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 77-131 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 148-98 and accompanying text (discussion of Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)); see also Employment Div. v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (holding that the free exercise clause permits a state to prohibit
sacramental peyote use and to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for
such use), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990). In Smith, the Court reversed the Oregon
Supreme Court's holding that the first amendment protects good faith use of peyote for
religious purposes even if state law does not permit its sacramental use. See Smith v.
Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 736 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied,
110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
6 See infra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 33-131 and accompanying text.
I
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belief but allowing the state to regulate religious practices and conduct.8 In later cases the Court applied strict scrutiny to protect religious practices and conduct by focusing on the effect of the
offending regulation rather than the form of its burden. 9 In this
way, the Court expanded protection of religious practices and conduct. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation, 10 however, the Court applied minimal scrutiny to a claim by American
Indians that a proposed government road would destroy their sacred religious grounds and prevent their free exercise of religion."
Lyng held that laws that tend to discourage religious practice but do
not coerce conduct contrary to religious belief need not meet a standard of strict scrutiny. 12 This Note argues that Lyng incorrectly
based its analysis on the form of the regulation, disregarding its deleterious effect on the Indians' ability to freely exercise their religion.
As a result, Lyng narrowed the scope of free exercise protection.
This Note concludes that the Court should have focused on the effect of the burden and applied strict scrutiny to the challenged regulation in accordance with prior precedent.
I
BACKGROUND

A. The Elements of Free Exercise: Belief and Conduct
The free exercise clause guarantees individuals the freedom to
hold any religious belief and the right to witness those beliefs in a
manner consonant with their faith and conscience.' 3 Although the
language of the clause provides textual support for the protection of
religious "exercise" or practice, the Supreme Court originally applied the guarantee of religious freedom only to belief.' 4 The Constitution does not specify the nature or scope of religious freedom,
and the First Congress's debates reveal little more than concern for
8 See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (discussion of United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
9 See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text (discussion of Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)); infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text (discussion of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (discussion of Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)).
10 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
11 See infra notes 148-198 and accompanying text (discussion of Lyng).
12 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
13

See Ira C. Lupu, FreeExercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employ-

ment Discrimination,67 B.U.L. Rev. 391,416 (1987) (discussing the first amendment guarantee of the substantive rights of religious liberty); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (free exercise encompasses both belief and practice).
14 See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (discussion of United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
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the relationship between conscientious belief and its expression.1 5
Nevertheless, the Court and commentators have recognized that the
free exercise clause must protect religious conduct or it will fail to
adequately safeguard the principal tenet of religious freedom-the
freedom of belief.16
"True" free exercise claims involve religious conduct primarily
and belief secondarily.' 7 Most commentators recognize that a state
can never successfully regulate belief per se.' s The characteristics
of self-determination, free will, and rationality reflect qualities of autonomous human beings. 19 They define an inherent condition of
freedom, a condition that the state can never directly regulate.
Viewed in this way, rights of free exercise are largely rights of autonomy. 20 For instance, laws can prevent one from acting in a certain
way, but they cannot make one believe such action is morally wrong.
Similarly, religious belief may prevent one from acting in a certain
way even though the state does not proscribe the action. Only in an
Orwellian nightmare could the state regulate individual autonomy
of thought.2 1 Accordingly, government regulations affecting religion necessarily focus on conduct, that is, on those actions that witness belief;2 2 they can only indirectly impact belief itself. While
individual autonomy may not itself provide the basis for significant
15

MICHAELJ. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS

OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 19 (1978).
16 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (free exercise designed to
prevent undermining of religious practices); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410

(1962) (state may not pressure individuals to abandon religious belief by conditioning
receipt of benefits upon foregoing religious practices).
17 Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution,
18 CONN. L. REv. 739, 772 n. 155 (1986). "True" free exercise cases are decided solely
on the basis of the free exercise clause and not in conjunction with other constitutional
provisions such as free speech or equal protection. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that a state may not deny unemployment benefits to religious convert whose employer discharged her for her subsequent
refusal to work on the day of her Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(holding that a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who quit his job in a steel foundry
for religious reasons could not be denied unemployment benefits on the ground that his
reason for quitting did not constitute 'good cause'); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (holding that compulsory school attendance law that conflicted with Amish religious practice violated free exercise clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(holding that state may not deny unemployment benefits to Seventh-Day Adventist

whose employer discharged her for her refusal to work on the day of her Sabbath).
18 See Lupu, supra note 13, at 416-17 n.93.
19 John Garvey, FreeExercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779,
790-91 (1986); Lupu, supra note 13, at 422.
20 Lupu, supra note 13, at 422; cf Garvey, supra note 19, at 801 (arguing that the
free exercise guarantee must protect values beyond those already associated with other
constitutional freedoms).
21 See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 6, 20 (1949) (imagining a futuristic
world where Thought Police patrol for unorthodox thinking ("thoughtcrime")).

22

Lupu, supra note 13, at 416-17; Lupu, supra note 17, at 772 n.155.
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free exercise protection, 23 it does provide a basis for the presumption that the free exercise clause protects religious conduct.2 4 Governmental interference with religion can take the form of
intentionally discriminatory treatment or a neutral state policy that
has an indirect but offensive effect on religious belief and practice. 25
Religious liberty consists of both the right to be free from discriminatory treatment and the right of "conscientious objection," or exemption, from offensive state policy. 26 In the past twenty-five years
the Court has sustained free exercise challenges to neutral state reg27
ulations that significantly burden sincere religious practices.
These cases evidence the Court's acknowledgement that protection
of religious liberty requires that religious conduct be insulated from
governmental interference.
B.

Development of Free Exercise Doctrine

In the course of a hundred-year evolution of free exercise jurisprudence, the Court recognized that individuals' ability to conduct
themselves in a manner consistent with the dictates of their faiths
underlies the fundamental right of religious freedom. The Court's
decisions acknowledged that the right to free exercise must extend
to good faith religious conduct so that majoritarian legislatures do
not, even inadvertently, sanction or discourage the beliefs of minority adherents. 28
23 See Garvey, supra note 19, at 790-92 for a discussion of why rights of autonomy
do not provide an appropriate basis for protecting rights of free exercise. Garvey argues
that autonomy rights are too general and would not distinguish between conduct based
on sincere religious belief and conduct indicative of personal choice or philosophy.
24 See Paul Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise
Clause, 1973 DuKE LJ. 1217, 1234 (arguing that even a narrow definition of religion
must encompass conduct as well as belief); Stephen Pepper, Taking the FreeExercise Clause
Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 300-12 (arguing that the Court's decision in Sherbert
established an independent meaning for the free exercise clause that extended protection to religiously motivated conduct as well as religious belief); see also cases cited supra
note 17; Harrop Freeman, A Remonstrancefor Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806 (1958)
(arguing that the first amendment must protect actions based on individual conscience
in order to keep society free and vital).
25
Lupu, supra note 13, at 416, 417.
26
Id. But cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (free exercise clause does not exempt religious adherents from government policy simply because the offending policy makes religious practice more difficult).
Insulating religious groups from the effects of government policy has been controversial because recognizing such exemptions promotes religious, as opposed to secular,
objections to state policy. Lupu, supra note 13, at 417; cf. William P. Marshall, Solving the
Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545, 553-54 (arguing
that treatment of all free exercise claims as free speech claims would avoid the controversy of according inconsistent treatment to religion and nonreligion).
27
See cases cited supra note 17.
28
See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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The Court's free exercise decisions also increasingly recognized
that the effect, rather than the form, of an offensive regulation must
control the constitutional analysis. 2 9 Traditionally, the Court had
deferred to the legislature in free exercise challenges.3 0 The Court
later applied strict scrutiny, but only when the challenged regulation
interfered directly with religious practices. 31 Finally, the Court applied strict scrutiny to regulations that indirectly burdened religious
practices, thereby dramatically increasing the scope of free exercise
32
protection.
By directing the constitutional focus to the effect of regulations, the Court implicitly affirmed that the free exercise clause protects religious conduct. For instance, by striking down facially
neutral laws that forced individuals to choose between government
benefits and religious practices, the Court applied a conduct theory
of free exercise. The challenged laws had no effect on belief. They
offended the first amendment because they compelled religiously
objectionable conduct.
1. Restricted Exercise Rights
Early Supreme Court decisions adopted a narrow interpretation
of the free exercise clause. The Court interpreted free exercise
rights as encompassing freedom of belief but not freedom of religiously motivated conduct. 33 The distinction between belief and conduct,3 4 first announced in Reynolds v. United States,35 allowed a state
to regulate religious conduct through legislation supporting the secular purpose of maintaining peace and order as long as the regula36
tion did not explicitly prohibit a particular belief.
Reynolds considered whether the constitutional guarantee of
See cases cited supra note 28.
See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (discussion of United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
31
See infra notes 53-73 and accompanying text (discussion of Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961)).
32 See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text (discussion of Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
33 See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding law prohibiting people
who practice or advocate bigamy from voting); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (upholding law prohibiting sacramental bigamy).
34 Commentators have criticized the "belief-conduct" distinction as an unrealistic
interpretation of free exercise rights because a state can never successfully regulate belief per se. See supra text accompanying note 18.
35 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
36
Id. at 164, 166; see also M. MALBIN, supra note 15, at 19-21 (discussing the draft
versions of the free exercise clause). Although Reynolds appears to have relied on the
congressional history of the religion clauses, the debates do not indicate that the framers
supported a belief-conduct distinction. In fact, Madison, who introduced the words
"free exercise" into the drafts, favored a broad protection of religious conduct. He supported protecting even conduct that "disturb[ed] the 'peace, happiness or safety' of so29
30
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religious freedom permitted Reynolds to practice bigamy in violation of a federal criminal statute.3 7 The Court held that religious

freedom did not encompass the right to practice bigamy.38 An examination of the history surrounding the drafting of the religion
clause amendment led the Reynolds Court to conclude that the Constitution granted Congress legislative power over all actions that

threatened the social order, but not power over opinion.3 9

Reynolds did not recognize that legislation aimed at maintaining
social order might infringe free exercise rights. The Court's analy-

sis of the constitutionality of sacramental bigamy began and ended
by acknowledging that the legislature had proscribed bigamy.4 0 The
Court stated that some religious practices, such as human sacrifice,

41
would fall within the realm of permissible government regulation.
It did not attempt to fashion a standard for evaluating when a prohi-

bition against religious practice would infringe religious freedom.
Reynolds refused to balance the potential effects on society that
would result from exempting the sacramental practice of bigamy
ciety unless the 'preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State be manifestly
endangered'" Id. at 22.
37
Reyno/ds, 98 U.S. at 162. At trial Reynolds proved that he was a sincere and practicing Mormon and that his religion required him, when circumstances permitted, to
practice bigamy or face damnation in the life to come. Id. at 161. In order to stem the
flow of evil consequences that supposedly flowed from plural marriages, Congress outlawed bigamy in 1862. Id. at 168.
38 Id. at 165.
39 Id. at 164. The Court gave considerable attention to a statement by Thomas
Jefferson in which he expressed his view of the constitutional guarantee:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only,
and not opinions-I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church
and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation
in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction
the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties.
Id. at 164 (quoting 8JErrF. WoRKs 113); see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604-05; see
also M. MALBIN, supra note 15, at 25-29 (comparing Madison's and Jefferson's views of
protecting religious beliefs).
40
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167 ("The only defence of the accused in this case is his
belief that the law ought not to have been enacted. It matters not that his belief was a
part of his professed religion: it was still belief, and belief only.").
41
Id at 166-67; cf id. at 167 ("[W]hen the offence consists of a positive act which is
knowingly done, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender might escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which he had broken ought never to have
been made. No case, we believe, can be found that has gone so far."). But see Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down criminal statute that significantly interfered
with claimants' free exercise of religion).
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against the effect on the Mormon faith of proscribing bigamy. 4 2
Reynolds also overlooked the relationship between religious
practice or conduct and religious belief. The Court flatly declared
that Reynolds's religious beliefs did not exempt his sacramental
practice of bigamy from legislative proscription. 4 3 The Court's failure to examine the relationship between belief and conduct led to
its failure to articulate a workable standard for evaluating the constitutionality of laws that prohibit certain religious practices. 44 Consequently, the Reynolds standard turned on the legality of the conduct
45
as determined by the legislature.
2.

Evolution of an Independent Standardfor Free Exercise Protection

During the first half of the twentieth century, the Court continued to deny free exercise challenges to laws that could be characterized as reasonable exercises of state police power aimed at
significant secular ends.4 6 The Court invalidated laws that interfered with free exercise only when the laws also violated other constitutional provisions. For instance, prior to 1940 the Court decided
cases involving free exercise rights under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 4 7 After Cantwell v. Connecticut48 held that
the fourteenth amendment incorporated first amendment freedoms,
the Court used the first amendment to strike down many state statMarcus, supra note 24, at 1218 n.9. The Reynolds court noted the long tradition
of criminal prohibitions against certain marriages in the Northern and Western European countries as well as in the American colonies and states. The Court relied on this
history in deciding that the framers did not intend the guarantee of religious freedom to
prohibit legislation against polygamy. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65.
43 See supra note 41; cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890) ("However
free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the
country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the
subjects of punitive legislation.").
44
The Mormon faith's subsequent renunciation and banning of polygamy has
largely mooted the bigamy issue in the free exercise context. Nevertheless, the cases in
this area are significant in their failure to weigh the effect that banning the practice may
have had on the Mormon faith against the interests of society. Marcus, supra note 24, at
1218 n.9.
45
Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605
(1990), discussed supra note 5.
46
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804
(1944) (state's interest in the health and moral well-being of children constituted a significant secular end that justified the indirect burden on free exercise).
47
See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (holding
that a state university does not violate the due process clause by requiring male students
to take courses in military training), rehk'g denied, 293 U.S. 633 (1935); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down statute requiring parents to send their children to public schools). See generallyJOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA &J. NELSON
42

YouNG, CoNsTrrurroNAL LAW 1053-55 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter NowAK] (detailed dis-

cussion of this line of cases).
48
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down statute requiring permit for religious
solicitation).
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utes that attempted to regulate the free exercise of religion. 49 The
Court, however, emphasized the infringement of free speech rights
rather than the infringement of free exercise rights. Furthermore,
the Court upheld government regulations that advanced secular
goals regardless of their coercive effect on the free exercise of religion. 50 Prior to the 1961 Braunfeld v. Brown 5 1 decision, the Court
had not fashioned a standard for evaluating legislative enactments
52
that restricted free exercise rights.
a. Emergence of the Rational Basis Standard.
In Braunfeld v. Brown 53 the Court considered whether a Sunday
closing law infringed the free exercise of religion. Abraham Braunfeld was an Orthodox Jew whose religion required him to observe
his Sabbath on Saturday. 5 4 In order to compensate for the loss of
Saturday business, Braunfeld kept his business open on Sunday in
violation of the Sunday closing law. 55 Although Braunfeld alleged
he would lose his business if forced to comply with the law, the
Court held that the indirect effect of the otherwise neutral law did
56
not infringe upon his free exercise of religion.
Braunfeld argued that the law was unconstitutional for several
reasons. Braunfeld stated that he did a substantial amount of business on Sunday to compensate for closing on Saturday to observe
his Sabbath. 5 7 Braunfeld contended that if his business closed for
the entire weekend, he would suffer substantial economic loss, to
the benefit of his non-Sabbatarian competitors.5 8 As a result of having to close on Sunday, Braunfeld would suffer an economic disadvantage sufficient to force him to open his business on Saturday and
thereby violate a basic tenet of his religion. 59
49 See, e.g., Follet v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (striking down license tax as applied to religious solicitation); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943) (striking down license tax as applied to religious solicitation); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding non-discretionary parade licensing system). See
generally NowAK, supra note 47, at 1056 (more detailed discussion of this line of cases).
50 NoWAK, supra note 47, at 1057.
51 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
52
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding a law prohibiting accompanied minors from selling religious merchandise in public). See generally NowAX, supra note 47, at 1056-57 (discussing Prince in the context of the development of
free exercise doctrine).
53
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
54

Id. at 601.

55 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1960) (repealed 1972)
provided that a violation of the Sunday closing law was punishable with a fine of up to
$100 for the first offense. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600 n.1.
56
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601, 609.
57 Id. at 602.
58
Id.
59 Id. Braunfeld further contended that the statute's effect would hinder his reli-
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Chief Justice Warren, writing for a plurality of four Justices, 60
announced a new standard for determining when a state regulation
placed an impermissible burden on free exercise. The ChiefJustice
stated that regulations rationally related to a secular legislative end
do not violate free exercise rights. 6 1 He also stated that indirect
burdens on free exercise would not be deemed constitutional unless
the state could not accomplish its goal by less restrictive means. 6 2 A
total of sixJustices 63 agreed that the public need for a Sunday day of
rest constituted a secular goal justifying the burden on Braunfeld's
religious practices. 64
b. The Casefor Strict Scrutiny.
Dissenting in Braunfeld, Justice Brennan framed the issue as
whether a State may force an individual to choose between his occupation and his religion. 6 5 Although the law did not explicitly compel or prohibit any religious practice, Justice Brennan argued that it
prevented any Orthodox Jew from competing effectively with Sunday-observing tradesmen. 66 Justice Brennan believed that such a
law inhibited the free exercise of religion by pressuring an individ67
ual to abandon his religious beliefs.
Justice Brennan disagreed with ChiefJustice Warren's use of a
rational basis standard for determining when a statute violates the
free exercise clause and argued for strict scrutiny instead. The
Court had previously held that legislation that offends the first
amendment free speech clause must meet a standard of strict scrutiny. 68 Justice Brennan argued that the state did not demonstrate a
gion in gaining new adherents and therefore subjected his religion to discriminatory
treatment by the state. Id.
60
Black, Clark and Whittaker, IJ., joined ChiefJustice Warren's opinion.
61
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
62
Id.
63
Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J., concurred in the judgment but wrote
separately.
64 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607, 609.
65 Id. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Stewart also dissented
from the plurality opinion, finding that the Sunday closing law unduly burdened Braunfeld's free exercise of religion. See id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 616 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
66 Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 See id. at 611, 613; cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (governmental imposition of choice between accepting benefits or adhering to religious belief violates free exercise clause).
68
See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319
U.S. 103 (1943).
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, held in 1940 that the individual liberties
guaranteed by the first amendment apply to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Where legislation
is challenged on due process grounds because the statute is allegedly too vague, courts
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compelling interest and thus could not justify the substantial,

though indirect, infringement on Braunfeld's ability to freely exercise his religion. 6 9 He distinguished Reynolds by noting that there

the state had possessed a strong interest in prohibiting polygamy, a
70
practice "deeply abhorred" by society.

Justice Brennan rejected the state's justification for the law's
burden on religion. He argued that Braunfeld's conduct satisfied
the state's secular interest in preserving a day of rest for the wellbeing of its citizens 7 1-in fact, Braunfeld's religion required such a
day.7 2 Justice Brennan concluded that mere "administrative con-

venience" should never be a sufficiently "rational" basis for an
otherwise discriminatory law.7 3
3.

Application of Strict Scrutiny to Free Exercise Challenges

The Court re-examined Chief Justice Warren's Braunfeld reasoning only two years later, in Sherbert v. Verner.74 There, after dissenting in Braunfeld, Justice Brennan found a majority voice for his
belief that the first amendment values the preservation of personal
liberty over the fulfillment of collective goals. 75 Although Sherbert
did not explicitly overrule Braunfeld, the reasoning of the Braunfeld
dissenters controlled the analysis in Sherbert.76
a. Free Exercise Precedent: the "Compelling Interest" Standard.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court ruled that South Carolina could
not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who
lost her job for refusing to work on her Saturday Sabbath. 77 South
Carolina's unemployment benefits eligibility law provided that a
use the rational basis standard of review. However, if the legislation is also challenged
on the grounds that it violates the first amendment, courts will use the higher strict
scrutiny standard, which is normally applied to first amendment challenges. See West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943), overruling Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
69
See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 613-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 614. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Reynolds.
71
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602-03.
72 Id. at 601.
73
Id. at 615-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("mhe Court, in my view, has exalted
administrative convenience to a constitutional level high enough to justify making one
religion economically disadvantageous.").
74 374 U.S. 398 (1963). It is worth noting that the Court decided Sherbert only two
years after Braunfeld, and that three of the fourJustices in Warren's plurality (Whittaker
had been, replaced by White, who dissented in Sherbert) joined Brennan's majority in
Sherbert, including Warren himself. Frankfurter, who had concurred in Braunfeld, had
been replaced by Goldberg, who joined Brennan in Sherbert.
75 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 See infra note 85.
77 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398. Sherbert filed for unemployment compensation bene-
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claimant must be "able" to work and "available" for work. 78 The
law also provided that a claimant would be ineligible for benefits if
she failed to accept suitable work without good cause. 79 The South
Carolina Supreme Court had rejected Sherbert's contention that the
disqualifying provisions of the unemployment statute abridged her
right to freely exercise her religion. 0 The state court held that the
statute did not prevent Sherbert from observing her religious beliefs
in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.8 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina
Supreme Court by a 7-2 margin, holding that the denial of unemployment benefits imposed an impermissible burden on Sherbert's
free exercise rights.8 2 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan argued that the South Carolina statute pressured Sherbert to work on
her Sabbath. 3 It forced her to choose between abandoning the
precepts of her religion by accepting work on her Sabbath day or
84
following her religion and forfeiting the unemployment benefits.
Justice Brennan viewed South Carolina's imposition of this choice as
equivalent to a fine imposed against Sherbert for Saturday worship.8 5 Furthermore, Justice Brennan rejected South Carolina's attempt to justify the statute on the grounds that the unemployment
benefits were merely a privilege and not a right: "It is too late in the
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege."'8 6 He concluded that conditioning the availability of unemployment benefits upon Sherbert's willingness to violate a principal tenet of her religion indirectly penalized her constitutional right
fits after unsuccessfully seeking employment that did not require Saturday work. Id. at
399 n.2.
78 Id. at 400 n.3.
79

Id.

Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 303-04, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (1962), rev'd, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
81
Id.
82
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
83
Id. at 404.
84
Id.
85 Id. Justice Stewart expressed a similar view in his Braunfeld dissent:
Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an OrthodoxJew to choose
between his religious faith and his economic survival. That is a cruel
choice. It is a choice which I think no State can constitutionally demand
.I think the impact of this law upon these appellants grossly violates
their constitutional right to the free exercise of their religion.
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. Even gratuitous public benefits cannot be conditioned
if that inhibits the exercise of first amendment freedoms. See Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958) (striking down conditions which limited a tax exemption to those people who pledged their alliance to the state government providing the exemption).
80
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to the free exercise of religion.8 7
b.

Sherbert Rejects Braunfeld's Reasoning and Accords Strict
Scrutiny to Indirect Burdens.

Braunfeld deferred to the legislature's secular goals by upholding a Sunday closing law that indirectly burdened religious practices. The plurality acknowledged that a law that indirectly
obstructed religious observances or discriminated between religions
would be unconstitutional.8 8 But the plurality strictly qualified this

acknowledgement by permitting indirect burdens on religious observance by laws rationally related to a secular purpose and imposed
89
through the least restrictive means.
In Sherbert, Justice Brennan rejected Braunfeld's reasoning and
announced a new standard of review for free exercise challenges:

when a law burdens religious practices, the state must show a compelling interest in the regulation that outweighs even an indirect

burden on free exercise. 90 Justice Brennan's inquiry began rather
than ended by recognizing that the denial of benefits was only an
indirect result of the state's welfare legislation. 9 ' He noted that the

language of the first amendment focuses on laws that prohibit free
exercise of religion, 9 2 and that a law neutral on its face but discriminatory in its application does not prohibit free exercise in the same
sense as a direct criminal prohibition. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan believed that a law that burdened religious practice would affect

an individual's free exercise to the same extent whether the state
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. A direct burden results when a law criminalizes a
religious practice. For a discussion of direct and indirect burdens, see Marcus, supra
note 24.
89 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
90 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. The Braunfeld court had refused to take this step: "To
strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect
burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the
religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature."
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
91 "[It is true that no criminal sanctions directly compel [Sherbert] to work a sixday week. But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry." Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 403-404. Brennan continued, "For '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions,
that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect.'" Id at 404 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607). The Braunfeld plurality
acknowledged the seriousness of even indirect burdens on religious practice but refused
to strike down laws that the state enacted in pursuit of secular goals, regardless of the
effect of those laws on religious practices. See supra note 90.
92 "Congress shallmake no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added).
87
88
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characterized the burden as direct or indirect. 93 Thus, in a major
departure from Braunfeld, Brennan required South Carolina to show
a compelling state interest that would justify even an incidental bur94
den on Sherbert's free exercise of religion.
Significantly, the South Carolina law also provided that when a
national emergency required the governor to temporarily lift the
Sunday labor laws, employers could not discriminate against employees who might be conscientiously opposed to Sunday work. 95
Under the statute, employers could not terminate Sunday worshipers for refusing to work on their Sabbath, yet Sherbert was discharged because she would not work on Saturday, the day of her
Sabbath. 9 6 Justice Brennan found that this religious discrimination
compounded the already unconstitutional denial of benefits to Sherbert. 9 7 This finding marked another departure from Braunfeld,
where the Court found that requiring everyone to observe Sunday
as the Sabbath constituted not only fair treatment but even a legitimate secular purpose.
South Carolina justified the infringement on Sherbert's religious freedom by arguing that a decision in her favor could lead to
the filing of fraudulent claims by people feigning religious objec98
tions and the dilution of the unemployment compensation fund.
Justice Brennan rejected this argument as too speculative and insubstantial to justify burdening free exercise. 9 9 He reiterated the new
strict scrutiny standard, leaving little doubt that Sherbert had rejected
the reasoning of Braunfeld: "It is basic that no showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest would Uustify
substantial infringement of First Amendment rights]; in this highly
sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses... give occa93 For instance, if South Carolina had a law requiring everybody to work on Saturday or face criminal sanction, Sherbert would have had to work on Saturday against the
dictates of her religion. The law in question had the same effect, because in order to
support herself, if Sherbert could not get unemployment compensation, she would have
to accept employment requiring her to work on her Sabbath.
Justice Brennan added that free speech analysis does not end with the determination that a law does not impose a direct prohibition on speech or assembly: "Under
some circumstances, indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or
taxes." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 n.5 (citations omitted).
94
Id. at 403.
95
Id. at 406.
96
Id at 399.
97
Id. at 406.
98 Id. at 407.
99 Id. Even if the possibility of fraudulent claims did threaten the viability of the
fund, the state would still need to demonstrate that no less restrictive forms of regulation could prevent the dilution without abridging first amendment rights. Id. The
Court rejected this argument again in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See
infra text accompanying note 130.
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sion for permissible limitation.' "100 Sherbert's holding left little
doubt that the Court believed the effect, rather than the form, of a
burden on religion controlled the constitutional analysis.
c.

Braunfeld Left in SuspendedAnimation.

Under the reasoning announced in Sherbert, Braunfeld would
have prevailed on his free exercise claim. As Justice Brennan stated
in Sherbert, forcing' 0 1 all people to observe a particular day as their
Sabbath discriminates against adherents who observe their Sabbath
on a different day than does the majority of the legislature. 0 2 The
state's interest in providing a common day of rest, like the state's
interest in preventing welfare fraud, represents a collective goal
which would not justify infringing an individual's free exercise
rights. 10 3 If anything, the impact of the law challenged in Sherbert
04
was less onerous than the law challenged in Braunfeld.
Justice Brennan declined to seize the opportunity in Sherbert to
overrule Braunfeld, even though three of the four Justices writing
separately stated that Sherbert necessarily overruled Braunfeld.'0 5
Nevertheless, the precedent set in Sherbert marked a significant shift
from the reasoning in Braunfeld. Sherbert's failure to overrule Braunfeld left open the possibility that the Court could return to the Braunfeld rational basis standard without formally overruling Sherbert.
100 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted). Contra Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607
(state may regulate conduct by enacting a law that indirectly burdens religious observance if purpose and effect of law is to advance state's secular goals).
101 Brennan stated in Sherbert that incidental burdens on religious observance have
the effect of forcing an adherent to choose between following the tenets of his religion
or abandoning them in order to receive the conditioned benefit. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
102
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
103
Id at 407; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610, 613-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But cf.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (refusing Amish workmen whose religion forbade them to pay social security taxes or receive benefits an exemption from compulsory
participation in the social security system).
104 Mrs. Sherbert would have lost only a few months of unemployment compensation, whereas Braunfeld faced the loss of his entire business investment. Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 417 (StewartJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 421 (Harlan and

White, JJ., dissenting).
105 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 417 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); id at 421 (Harlan
and White, JJ., dissenting). One of the reasons Stewart did not join the Court's opinion
was because it did not overrule Braunfeld. Id. at 417; see also Marcus, supra note 24, at
1239 (arguing that although Brennan did not expressly overrule Braunfeld, the majority
in Sherbert rejected its reasoning).
Instead of overruling Braunfeld, Brennan unconvincingly attempted to distinguish it
from Sherbert, relying on arguments made by the Braunfeld plurality that Brennan himself
had fiercely attacked in his dissent and even rejected earlier in the Sherbert opinion. Perhaps Justice Brennan sensed that ChiefJustice Warren, part of Brennan's five-man majority, might have found it unpalatable to join an opinion that overruled Braunfeld, an
opinion the ChiefJustice had written only two years earlier.
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Such a return would radically restrict first amendment free exercise
protection.
4. Expansion of Free Exercise Doctrine
After Sherbert, the Court used the free exercise clause to strike
down several laws that both directly and indirectly burdened religious practices. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 06 the Court invalidated a
criminal statute that interfered with Amish religious tradition. In
Thomas v. Review Board,10 7 the Court struck down a state welfare law
that denied unemployment benefits to an individual who quit his job
for religious reasons.' 0 8 Sherbert's strict scrutiny standard figured
prominently in these decisions.
a. Religiously Motivated Conduct Outweighs Criminal Prohibition.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 10 9 the Court considered whether a Wisconsin compulsory education statute violated the Amishs' free exercise
rights. As the Mormon faith once mandated the practice of polygamy, the Old Order Amish communities believed that spiritual salvation required a separation from contemporary society. 1 0 The
Amish did not send their children to school beyond the eighth grade
because they feared that public school attendance exposed their
children to worldly influences that would undermine the Amish
community and religion."I' Jonas Yoder, an Amish farmer, was convicted for refusing to send his children to school in accordance with
the statute. 12 The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the conviction,
but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, 113 sustaining Yoder's
free exercise claim. In a lengthy opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
the Supreme Court affirmed. Following the Sherbert analysis, Chief
Justice Burger sought to determine whether the Wisconsin law burdened Amish religious practices, and if so, whether a compelling
state interest existed to justify the burden. The ChiefJustice found
that the Amish belief in a way of life detached from contemporary
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (striking down another state welfare law that denied unemployment benefits to an individual
who was fired after converting to a religion that observed the Sabbath on Saturday).
109 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
110 Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments, 1971
Wis. L. REv. 832 (authored by Norman Prance).
111
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217-18.
112
Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969) provided that any person having under his control a
child between the ages of 7 and 16 should cause such a child to regularly attend public
or private school or suffer a fine of not less than $5 nor more than $50, imprisonment
for not more than 3 months, or both. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207 n.2.
113 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971), aft'd, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
106
107
108
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worldly society was central to the Amish faith.' 14 He concluded that
forcing Amish children to attend high school and exposing them to
worldly influences at the crucial adolescent stage would substantially interfere with the development of their faith.' 1 5
The Court noted that Wisconsin's professed interest in ensuring that its children receive a basic level of education represented a
strong and neutral state interest.' 16 ChiefJustice Burger, however,
found the vocational training that Amish children undertook upon
their return to their community sufficient to satisfy Wisconsin's interest. 1 7 He concluded that Wisconsin's strong interest in protecting its children from growing up in ignorance did not outweigh the
deleterious effect that enforcing the compulsory attendance law
would have on the Amish religion. 188
In recognizing that Wisconsin's attendance law violated the
Amish's free exercise rights, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to
protecting individuals from both direct and indirect infringements
on free exercise rights. 1 9 The impact of the law in Yoder was directly coercive, yet the Court relied on Sherbert for the proposition

that a facially neutral regulation will violate the constitutional guarantee of free exercise if its operation threatens to undermine reli20
gious practices.'
1 4 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210. Yoder implies that regulations which infringe upon practices "central" to a religious belief constitute a burden to that religious practice significant enough to trigger strict scrutiny review. Id. American Indians, however, have been
unsuccessful in attempting to rely on this "centrality" theory to invoke constitutional
protection of their free exercise rights with respect to public land use. See, e.g., Wilson v.
Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.) (dismissing American Indian protest of development of
a ski resort area that would interfere with sacred ceremonies), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (rejecting American Indian claim for
injunctive relief based on their contentions that state regulation of access to sacred religious grounds violated the free exercise clause), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); see also
Dean Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1982) ("the courts have not
yet found an Indian religious practice to be 'central' when the use of public lands is at
issue").
115 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. Burger emphasized the differences between contemporary society and Amish society: "The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and
scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness .... Amish society emphasizes ... a life of 'goodness,' rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical
knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition." Id. at 211.
116 Id. at 221.
117 After eighth grade, Amish children return to their community to acquire Amish
attitudes favoring manual work, self-reliance, and the skills needed to fit the role of
Amish housewife or farmer. The Amish develop these skills, which have perpetuated
the Amish society for 300 years, in a "learn-through-doing" manner. Id. at 211, 219.
118 Id. at 234.
119 Id. at 220.
120
Id. at 218. But see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 457 (1988) (regulation must be coercive to merit strict scrutiny).
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Individual Exemption From State Regulation.

In 1981 the Court applied Sherbert again in Thomas v. Review
Board.' 2 1 Eddie Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness employed in a steel
foundry, quit his job for religious reasons when he learned that the
steel he fashioned was being used to produce armaments. 12 2 The
Indiana Employment Commission denied unemployment compensation benefits to Thomas, claiming that his voluntary dismissal did
not constitute "good cause" as defined by the unemployment compensation statute. 123 The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed, finding that Thomas quit for personal reasons and therefore did not
24
qualify for benefits or for protection under the first amendment.'
Chief Justice Burger led the majority in overruling the Indiana
25
Supreme Court with a straightforward application of Sherbert.'
Like the statute in Sherbert, the neutral Indiana law did not compel
Thomas to abandon his religious practices with a threat of criminal
sanction. 2 6 But as Sherbert noted, this finding only begins the inquiry.' 2 7 Thomas reaffirmed that the effect of a law rather than its
form controls the constitutional analysis. Thus, even a neutral regulation may be unconstitutional if it unduly burdens free exercise
rights.' 28 Chief Justice Burger found the coercive impact on
Thomas indistinguishable from that in Sherbert, noting that although
the compulsion was indirect, the infringement upon free exercise
29
was nevertheless substantial.'
As in Sherbert, the Thomas Court found that Indiana had failed to
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Thomas's religious beliefs specifically precluded him from directly aiding in the
production of military weapons. Id. at 711.
125
IND. CODE § 22-4-15-1 (Supp. 1978) provides in relevant part: "[a]n individual
who has voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection with the work
or who was discharged from his employment forjust cause shall be ineligible for waiting
period or benefit rights .... "
According to the Indiana Supreme Court, "Good cause which justifies voluntary
dismissal must be job-related and objective in character." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712-13.
124
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713. The state court also held that even if Thomas did quit
for religious reasons, religion did not constitute "good cause" objectively related to
work under Indiana law. Id. Furthermore, the court held that any indirect burden on
appellant's religion was justified by the state's legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the insurance fund and discouraging employees from quitting work for personal
reasons. Id.
125
See infra note 131 for a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting views.
126
Cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (the Amish had to choose between abandoning
their beliefs or subjecting themselves to criminal sanction); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599
(1961) (Braunfeld had to choose between staying open on Sunday in violation of the
Sunday closing laws or working on Saturday in violation of his Sabbath).
127
See supra note 91.
128 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220).
129
Id. at 717-18. The Court rejected an attempt to distinguish Sherbert on the
grounds that Thomas had voluntarily quit whereas Sherbert had been dismissed by the
employer, reasoning that had Thomas presented himself at the job but refused to work,
121
122
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provide convincing evidence that Thomas' claim jeopardized the
unemployment insurance fund or that large numbers of workers
would find themselves in Thomas' predicament, thereby creating
widespread unemployment. 130 Accordingly, the Court found that
Indiana had not met its burden of showing that its statute presented
the least restrictive means of achieving an overriding state
31
interest.l
he would have been dismissed. Id. at 718; see John Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the
Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 193.
130
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717.
131
In both Sherbert and Thomas, the Court acknowledged a tension between the free
exercise clause and the establishment clause of the first amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
). By forcing a state to pay benefits to an
individual to accomodate that individual's religious beliefs, the Court appeared to be on
a collision course with the Constitution's prohibition against establishment of religion.
In Sherbert and Thomas, the Court confidently asserted that by recognizing exemptions
based on the free exercise clause it was not fostering the establishment of religion.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409). Rather, the Court believed
that in extending benefits to Saturday as well as Sunday worshippers, it fostered no
more than "the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences,
and [did] not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is
the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall." Id. at 720.
Justice Rehnquist, however, dissenting in Thomas, blamed the existence of the tension between the religion clauses on the Court's overly expansive interpretion of both
clauses. "The [Thomas decision] illustrates how far astray the Court has gone in interpreting the [Religion] Clauses of the First Amendment .... Just as it did in Sherbert v.
Verner... the Court today reads the Free Exercise Clause more broadly than is warranted." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 722. Justice Rehnquist accepted the Braunfeld decision and
the dissent in Sherbert as the proper interpretation of the free exercise clause, rejecting
the application of strict scrutiny to general statutes that have the purpose and effect of
advancing the state's secular goals. See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND LAW 40-41 (1962)
(arguing that a court may not invalidate a law on free exercise grounds unless it is also
invalidated as to nonreligious individuals-otherwise the court would violate the establishment clause); see also Marcus, supra note 24, at 1236 (arguing that Professor Kurland's broad view of the establishment clause has never been accepted by the American
judiciary, perhaps because it would emasculate the free exercise clause).
Dissenting in Sherbert,JusticesWhite and Harlan argued that states must now "single
out for financial assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though it
denies such assistance to others whose identical behavior ... is not religiously motivated." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (emphasis in original). The dissent's comparison, however, is misleading. The individuals "singled out" in these cases represent minority
religious adherents who have been denied benefits as an indirect result of their religious
beliefs. If they are "singled out" for any purpose, it is to acknowledge that their religious freedom has been infringed, a freedom that has classically been highly valued in
our society. See Marcus, supra note 24, at 1218; see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 454 (1971) (stating that providing religious exemptions is not inconsistent with
neutrality as long as the exemption is broad enough to reflect valid secular purposes).
But see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (holding that a statute
that provides Sabbath workers with an unqualified right not to work on their chosen
Sabbath violates the establishment clause).
In Sherbert Justice Douglas acknowledged the precarious position of the minority
adherent:
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The Majority Divides: Pullingin the Reins?

A split occurred in the Court's collective interpretation of free
exercise doctrine in Bowen v. Roy. 13 2 Roy considered whether the

government's use of a social security number in its computer systems violated the free exercise clause. Stephen Roy, a member of
the Abenaki Indian Tribe, objected to the government's use of the
social security number issued in the name of his two-year-old
daughter, Little Bird of the Snow. He claimed that use of the
number would "rob the spirit" of his daughter and prevent her, as
well as his own, free exercise of religion.133 Roy obtained an injunction in federal district court permanently restraining the state and
federal governments from using the number. The court also enjoined the government from refusing to provide benefits because of
34
Roy's refusal to provide his daughter's social security number.'
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, held that the government's use of a social security number in the administration of its
benefit plans did not infringe Roy's or his daughter's free exercise
rights.13 5 The free exercise clause, he reasoned, did not require the
government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport
36
with the religious beliefs of individual citizens.'
[Miany people hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society-beliefs that are protected by the First Amendment but which could easily be
trod upon under the guise of "police" or "health" regulations reflecting
the majority's views.
Some have thought that a majority of a community can, through state
action, compel a minority to observe their particular religious scruples so
long as the majority's rule can be said to perform some valid secular
function.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 411-12 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Requiring strict scrutiny for laws that burden religious practices simply protects minorities against the legislature's natural and unconscious bias toward its own views.
However, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas represented an ominous fissure in the
Court's collective interpretation of the free exercise clause.
132
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
133
Id. at 696. Roy testified at trial why the use of his daughter's social security
number would be contrary to his religious beliefs as a native Abenaki:
[W]e felt that this number would be used to rob her of her ability to have
greater power in that this number is a unique number. It serves unique
purposes. It's applied to her and only her; and being applied to her,
that's what offends us, and we try to keep her person unique, and we're
scared that if we were to use this number, she would lose control of that
and she would have no ability to protect herself from any evil that the
number might be used against her.
Id. at 697 n.3.
134
Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
135
Roy, 476 U.S. at 700.
136
Id. at 699. "'[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can extract from
the government.' " Id. at 700 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
ChiefJustice Burger likened Roy's claim to a sincere religious objection to the size
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Although a majority of the Court believed that the government's use of Little Bird's social security number did not impair
Roy's free exercise of religion, the Court was divided over the issue
of whether requiring Roy to provide his daughter's social security
number to obtain government benefits violated the free exercise
clause. The Chief Justice, joined by only two other Justices, concluded that the requirement did not infringe Roy's free exercise
rights.1 3 7 Chief'Justice Burger distinguished between administrative
and prohibitory regulations, reasoning that a uniformly applicable
and neutral statute that forces an individual to choose between governmental benefits or adherence to religious beliefs differs completely from a direct prohibition that criminalizes religiously
motivated activity. 13 8 He argued that administrative regulations
that are wholly neutral and uniformly applicable do not burden religious freedom where no government compulsion is involved.' 3 9
ChiefJustice Burger even suggested that absent proof of discriminatory intent, the government could meet its burden in free exercise
challenges by demonstrating that the challenged regulation was uniform in its application and a reasonable means of promoting a legiti40
mate public interest.'
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
sharply criticized Chief Justice Burger for invoking this new standard, noting that the test had no basis in precedent.' 4 1 The Sherbert
court had rejected the same reasoning, holding that the governmental imposition of the choice between receiving benefits or adhering
to religious belief was tantamount to a direct prohibition against
that belief.14 2 Chief Justice Burger's analysis, squarely in conflict
with Sherbert, relegated free exercise protection to the lowest level of
43
scrutiny already provided by the equal protection clause.'
With the exception of Justice Stevens, who concluded that the
issue was moot, 14 4 the remaining five Justices believed that Sherbert
or color of the government's filing cabinets. Id. The ChiefJustice stated that the free
exercise dause "affords an individual protection from certain governmental compulsion;
it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." Id.
137 Id. at 712 (Burger, G.J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
138 Id. at 703-06. But see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that governmental imposition of a choice between receipt of benefits or adherence to religious
practices violates the Constitution).
139 Roy, 476 U.S. at 703, 704.
140
Ii at 707, 708 (Burger, CJ., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
141
Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
142
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404; see also supra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
143 Roy, 476 U.S. at 727 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
144 Once the Court had vacated the injunction preventing the government from
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and its progeny should control the issue of whether Roy would need
to provide his daughter's social security number in order to receive
benefits.1 4 5 Having determined that the requirement burdened
Roy's free exercise rights, the Court, Justice O'Connor argued,
should have applied the long line of precedents requiring the government to show an overriding interest in enforcing the regulation. 14 6 Indeed, the government argued that social security
numbers were needed to prevent fraud but did not show how providing the religious exemption sought by Roy would demonstrably
1 47
diminish the government's ability to combat welfare fraud.
Roy signaled that at least three of the Justices were prepared to
shift the free exercise analysis from the effect of the burden back to
the form, thereby restricting the protection of religious conduct previously afforded by Sherbert and its progeny. Chief Justice Burger's
plurality opinion ominously echoed the rational basis reasoning of
Braunfeld and suggested that Court was retreating from the expansive scope of free exercise protection established by Sherbert.
II
THE LYNG CASE: A RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN FREE
EXERCISE DOCTRINE

In April, 1988 the Court decided Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,148 reversing a court of appeals decision that
had sustained a free exercise challenge based on the compelling
state interest test.1 4 9 In Lyng, American Indians challenged the
United States Forest Service's plan to construct a six-mile paved
road through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National
Forest in northwestern California. The Yurok, Karok and
50
Tolowathe tribes used this area for their sacred religious rituals.
The proposed plan also called for substantial timber harvesting in
making routine use of Little Bird of the Snow's social security number, Justice Stevens
saw nothing in the record that prevented Roy from receiving the disputed payments.
Roy, 476 U.S. at 720 (Stevens, J., concurring in the result).
145 Justice Blackmun also considered the free exercise issue moot but addressed the
issue hypothetically, concluding that Sherbert would control and prevent the government
from denying Roy benefits for refusing, on religious grounds, to provide his daughter's
social security number. Id. at 715-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
146 Id. at 727-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147
Id. at 728.
148
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
149
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that the Sherbert line of cases controlled the Indians' free exercise claim
and that the state had failed to show a compelling state interest in building the road
sufficient to justify the burden on the Indians' free exercise), rev'd, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
150 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442. The Hoopa Valley Indian reservation adjoins the Six Rivers National Forest, and the Chimney Rock area has traditionally been a religious domain for the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Indians. Id. at 442.
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the Chimney Rock area.' 5 ' Relying on the compelling interest standard developed in Sherbert and its progeny, the district court held

that the proposed activities violated the free exercise clause by significantly burdening the American Indians' religious practices while
serving a comparatively insubstantial state interest. 5 2 The district
court also found that no other geographic areas held equivalent reli-

gious significance for the Indian tribes. 153 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's constitutional ruling, concluding that the government had failed to demonstrate a compelling in154
terest in completing the road.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the free exercise issue on its merits.' 55 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor
held that the free exercise clause does not require the government

to present compelling justifications for incidental effects of its programs that render religious practice more difficult but have no ten-

dency to force individuals to act in a manner contrary to their
beliefs.1 56
In holding that the American Indians' free exercise claim did

not require the government to present a compelling interest, Lyng
significantly altered the free exercise precedent established by Sherbert and its progeny.

57

The Court's refusal to extend constitutional

protection to the religious practices of the American Indians signaled a substantial retreat from the expansive protection afforded to
earlier free exercise claims.
III
ANALYSIS

A.

Lyng Misapplies Roy and Yoder

The Lyng Court's efforts to analogize its facts to those in Bowen
v. Roy 158 and to distinguish Wisconsin v. Yoder 159 were unavailing.
151
152

Id at 443.

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nora, Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Further statutory violations associated with the proposed activities led the district court to permanently enjoin road
building and timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area. Id. at 606-07.
153 Id. at 594.
154 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.
1986), rev'd sub nom, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988). The court of appeals vacated those portions of the district court's injunction
relating to timber harvesting that had been rendered moot by a congressional act declaring the Chimney Rock area wilderness off limits to commercial activities. ld at 698.
155 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988).
156 Id. at 448.
157 See cases cited supra note 17.
158 476 U.S. 693 (1986); see supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
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Justice O'Connor professed to find no meaningful distinction between the government's use of a social security number in Roy and
the road building and timber harvesting on public lands in Lyng,
insofar as both constituted internal government procedures.1 60 The
Court, however, glossed over the fact that federal land use decisions
have substantial external effects and undergo public scrutiny. 16 1 Indeed, Congress had earlier recognized the potentially adverse impacts of land use decisions on American Indians when it enacted the
1 62
American Indian Religious Freedom Act ("AIRFA").
Furthermore, the distinction between administrative and prohibitive regulations that Chief Justice Burger examined in Roy had
no application in Lyng. 163 Even though the use of a social security
number may serve an administrative end, the use of the number in
the government's computer systems could only conceptually interfere with free exercise rights. However, although the proposed road
in Lyng may also serve an administrative end, the act of clearing the
forest and the resulting destruction of the Indians' sacred religious
areas would, as the Court admitted, "have severe adverse effects on
the practice of their religion." 16 4 The Court's attempt to distinguish
between prohibitive and administrative regulations amounted to no
more than a distinction between direct and indirect burdens, a dis65
tinction the Court correctly rejected in Sherbert v. Verner.'
The Court's efforts to distinguish Yoder were equally unsatisfactory. The Court maintained that the coercive effect of the statute,
rather than its impact on Amish religious values, controlled in
Yoder.1 6 6 Yoder, however, did not confine its analysis to the coercive
impact of the compulsory school attendance. It focused on the "inescapable" objective danger the statute posed to free exercise
rights. The Court determined that the threat compulsory education
406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
"'The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of
particular citizens.'" Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448 (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 699).
161
Id. at 470-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). AIRFA recognizes that many federal land use decisions cause infringements on Indian religious practices, but does not provide any statutory relief.
163
See Roy, 476 U.S. at 700 (free exercise rights do not afford an individual the right
to dictate the internal affairs of government).
164 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447.
165 See Marcus, supra note 24, at 1238-39 (arguing that Sherbert eliminated the distinction between direct and indirect burdens that Braunfeld had created).
166 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 456-57. The Court accused the dissent of misreading Yoder,
claiming "there is nothing whatsoever in the Yoder opinion to support the proposition
that the 'impact' on the Amish religion would have been constitutionally problematic if
the statute at issue had not been coercive in nature." Id. But see supra notes 119-20 and
accompanying text (interpreting Yoder to govern even facially neutral regulations).
159
160
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posed to the existence of the Amish community and religion embodied the precise menace that the free exercise clause was intended to prevent. 16 7 Thus, the Yoder Court did rely on an analysis
of the law's impact on Amish religious values and practices. Furthermore, the Amish could have sustained their beliefs by moving to
a more tolerant area. The Indian faith, however, is inextricably
bound to the land, which is site-specific and sacred. 168 The proposed road threatened to destroy the Indians' ability to practice
their religion-yet the Court found nothing coercive or prohibitory
9
about such an "incidental" effect. 16
B.

Determining the "Effect" on Religion: Form or Substance?

Under Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny the aim of free exercise
protection is to safeguard religious expression from government interference by permitting an individual to conform her conduct to
the dictates of her conscience.' 7 0 The Constitution must protect
religious practice and conduct to the extent necessary to allow free
expression of religious belief.' 7 ' A law that burdens conduct beyond this point offends the first amendment regardless of its
form.17 2 Nevertheless, the Lyng majority held that when the form of
the burden was indirect, the offending regulation did not merit strict
scrutiny regardless of its effect on religious practice. 173 As Justice
O'Connor herself remarked in Roy, however, this direct/indirect
distinction has no basis in precedent 174 and emasculates free exercise protection. 175 By ignoring the effect of the burden on religion,
167
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 ("compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious
practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief.., or be forced to migrate
to some other and more tolerant region.").
168 See Suagee, supra note 114, at 10 (explaining that the site-specific nature of
American Indian religious practice stems from the Indians' belief that land itself is a
living, sacred being).
169 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. But see id. at 458, 468-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W]e
have recognized that laws that affect spiritual development by impeding the integration
of children into the religious community or by increasing the expense of adherence to
religious principles-in short, laws that frustrate or inhibit religious practice-trigger the
protections of the constitutional guarantee.").
170 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
171
See Marcus, supra note 24, at 1234 (arguing that religion, however narrowly defined, must encompass action as well as belief).
172
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
173
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450; see also Roy v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 693, 704 (1986); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961).
174
The distinction has no basis in precedent unless one considers thatJustice Brennan declined in Sherbert to explicitly overrule Braunfeld, which did draw the distinction
between direct and indirect burdens. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
175
Roy, 476 U.S. at 727.
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Lyng exhibited "distressing insensitivity" 176 to the constitutional
guarantee of free exercise, reminiscent of the religious discrimina177
tion sanctioned by Braunfeld v. Brown.
The constitutional "obligation of neutrality"' 178 in religious
matters does not restrict the Court from protecting the rights guaranteed by the religion clauses. Accordingly, if the guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the free exercise clause has any
independent meaning, it must require the government to maintain a
hospitable environment for individual belief and expression. 179 To
avoid conflict with the establishment clause,' 8 0 the government may
not assist or endorse any or all religions.' 8 ' Nevertheless, the
Court's duty under the free exercise clause requires it to protect
minority adherents from legislatively imposed religious discrimination. The government could not pass a law outlawing the religious
beliefs of the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Indians. When the government passes a neutral regulation that effectively destroys the Indians' ability to practice those beliefs, as the proposed road
threatened to do in Lyng, the Court has an obligation to respect the
Indians' free exercise rights by overturning the law.
The free exercise clause "is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual
can exact from the government."' 1 82 The Indians in Lyng did not
seek assistance or support from the government; they sought to prevent the government from building a road that would "virtually destroy ... [their] ability to practice their religion."' 8 3 Of course, the
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 413 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Consonant with Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas, the Lyng decision
suggests that the Court is returning to the narrower Braunfeld construction of free exercise protection. See supra note 131 for a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Thomas.
178
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 415-16 (Stewart, J., concurring). Sherbert's inquiry emphasized governmental accommodation of individual belief rather than governmental
enforcement of regulations at the expense of individual religious freedom.
180 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .. " U.S.
CONsT. amend. I.
181 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 ("Neither a state nor the Federal
government ... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), the Court wrote that a statute must pass a three-part test to withstand
an establishment clause challenge: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). In Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984), the Court stated that a challenged statute
will fail the Lemon test if its purpose or effect conveys endorsement or disapproval of
religion. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also supra note 131.
182 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
183 Id. (quoting Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, 795 F.2d at 693).
176

17
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extent of the injury should not determine the result. In Sherbert, for
instance, the offensive regulation deprived Sherbert of at most "a
few months of relatively low unemployment compensation benefits."' 8 4 The harm, however, resulted from the state's interference
18 5
with Sherbert's religious beliefs and her ability to practice them.
The fact that the proposed road in Lyng would virtually destroy the
Indians' ability to practice their religion makes their claim more
compelling, but the religious practice would deserve protection
even if the harm were less.
When a legislature passes a law that directly or indirectly infringes on religious belief or conduct, the effect, not the form, of the
law's burden on free exercise must control the constitutional analysis. As Sherbert recognized, the correct disposition of free exercise
challenges should depend on the law's effect on both the individual's beliefs and the individual's ability to conduct herself in a manner consistent with those beliefs.18 6 By focusing on the indirect
effect of the proposed road on the Indians, Lyng incorrectly allowed
the form of the regulation to control the constitutional analysis. In
so doing, the Court revitalized Braunfeld's direct/indirect burden
distinction that Sherbert had implicitly overruled.
C.

Re-emergence of the Direct/Indirect Burden Distinction

Lyng's conclusion that the indirect effect of a neutral regulation
is less intrusive than affirmative compulsion or direct prohibition is
also flawed.' 8 7 Sherbert abolished the distinction between direct and
indirect effects on religious practices as one that lacked constitutional significance. 18 8 For instance, presumably even the Lyng Court
would invalidate a coercive law that directly prohibited adherents
from visiting a unique sacred area, unless the state could justify the
law with an overriding secular interest.'8 9 Such a law would absolutely prohibit the adherents from practicing their religion. Under
the Lyng analysis, a law that denied everyone access to a road that
happened to be the only road leading to the sacred site would not
violate the Constitution because it would have "no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs."' 9 0
Yet such a law would create an effect identical to that of the direct
prohibition. In both cases, the state would effectively prohibit the
adherents from practicing their religion in accordance with their
184
185
186
187
188
189

Marcus, supra note 24, at 1239 n.119.
See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
Marcus, supra note 24, at 1239.
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
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faith. Permitting the form of a burden to control the constitutional
analysis thus narrows the scope of free exercise protection because
individuals will suffer from a law's effect, regardless of its form.
The distinction between direct and indirect effects on free exercise, although straightforward on the surface, has considerable constitutional significance. In the case of a direct burden such as a
criminal prohibition, the adherent faces an immediate dilemma: remain faithful to religious belief or suffer the sanction imposed by
law. 19 1 Criminal prohibitions represent the most intrusive burdens
because direct burdens emphatically deny religious freedom and
signal governmental rejection of the religion in question.
The difficulty with indirect burdens lies in their subtle application. Indirect burdens usually result from laws that apply to all citizens equally. The dilemma appears less extreme because of its
incidental nature. For example, where a state mandates that stores
must close on Sunday to provide a common day of rest for the good
of society, the state's interest in protecting the health of its citizens
represents a secular goal achieved through a neutral statute. 19 2 A
Saturday Sabbatarian, however, may find himself disadvantaged by
such a law. If he needed to stay open on Sunday to make up for the
business lost on Saturday, the Sabbatarian might have to choose between foregoing his Sabbath or going out of business. The government's imposition of this choice interferes with the individual's
religious practice and tends to compel conduct inconsistent with
religious belief.193 The Lyng Court relied on government compulsion as the touchstone of its analysis, 19 4 but ignored the fact that
indirect burdens on religion can also have a coercive effect.
D. Lyng Revokes Protection of Indirect Burdens
Lyng acknowledged that the Court had in the past applied strict
scrutiny to indirect burdens on the free exercise of religion.' 9 5 In
'Sherbert, for instance, Justice Brennan compared a state's denial of
unemployment benefits to a woman whose religion prohibited her
from accepting employment requiring Saturday work to a fine imposed on worship.19 6 Justice Brennan's analogy correctly characterized the burden as indirect. Although the law did not directly
191 For example, an Amish father acting in accordance with his religious beliefs
faced a fine and imprisonment for refusing to send his children to school. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
192 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607-08 (1961).
193 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
194 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
195 Id
196
See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
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prevent Sherbert from observing her Saturday Sabbath, it required
her to forego her religious beliefs in order to receive state benefits.
In Lyng, however, Justice O'Connor mischaracterized the
Court's prior treatment of and distinction between direct and indirect burdens. A fine imposed on worship constitutes a direct burden; the law in Sherbert, as Justice Brennan admitted, created only an
indirect effect. 19 7 YetJustice O'Connor recharacterized the indirect
burden in Sherbert as a direct burden. Justice O'Connor needed to
do so in order to avoid explicitly overruling Sherbert, since that case
had affirmatively applied strict scrutiny to laws that only indirectly
burdened religious practices. 198 Under the Lyng analysis, indirect
burdens do not violate the free exercise clause.
E.

Potential Effects of Lyng on Free Exercise Precedent

The future impact of Lyng will depend on how courts distinguish between governmental regulations that compel affirmative
conduct incompatible with religious beliefs and regulations that
make religious practices more difficult or illegal. 199 In many cases,
as in Lyng, the effect of the offensive regulation on religious practice
will be the same, whether the burden is characterized as direct or as
indirect. For instance, would a law denying unemployment benefits
to an individual because her religion forbids her to work on Saturday compel her to work on Saturday against her beliefs, or simply
make it more difficult for her to rest on her Sabbath as her faith
dictates? Would a law compelling Amish children to attend public
school coerce them into acting inconsistently with their faith, or
merely make it more difficult for them to act in accordance with it?
In both cases the distinction between direct and indirect burdens
becomes muddled 20 0 and lacks constitutional significance. Unfortunately, Lyng makes this ambiguous distinction the touchstone of free
exercise protection. The Court should abandon this distinction in
free exercise challenges and apply strict scrutiny to laws that both
directly and indirectly restrict the free exercise of religion.
See Marcus, supra note 24, at 1239.
198
See supra note. 90 and accompanying text.
199 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 The regulation in Lyng did not affirmatively compel the Yurok, Karok and
Tolowa Indians to act against their beliefs; rather, as Lyng held, the proposed road construction would simply make it more difficult (if not impossible) for them to practice
their religion. Id at 451. But the effect on their free exercise rights is no less drastic.
Indeed, Lyng presents a more compelling case than any of the cases in the Sherbert line,
because the proposed road construction would not simply hinder the Indians' ability to
practice their religion but would virtually destroy their religion altogether. See id at
466-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197
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CONCLUSION

After Lyng, Sherbert'sviability is uncertain. Lyng signals an inappropriate revival of the distinction between direct and indirect burdens that Braunfeld adopted and Sherbert rejected, and means that
free exercise protection will be subject to the lowest level of scrutiny. The scope of the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of
religion now depends on the Court's tenuous distinction between
regulations that coercively impact religious practices and regulations that only make it more difficult for an individual to practice his
beliefs.
Lyng's refusal to extend protection to indirect as well as direct
burdens on free exercise rights rests on a misplaced concentration
on the form, rather than on the effect of the regulation's burden.
The Court has mistakenly forsaken the protection of religious practices and conduct as the best means of securing the right to free
exercise of religion, and has therefore eroded that right. The Court
should return to the standard developed in Sherbert and its progeny
and apply strict scrutiny to laws that either directly or indirectly burden the free exercise of religion.
J Brett Pritchard

